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 Abstract :  The roots of public administration are in the fields of management, political science, and the law. The 
law is underrepresented in the literature and is not as well understood by nonlawyer practitioners, yet it increasingly 
enables, constrains, and prescribes government action. In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a case involving 
whether a government grant awarded on secular criteria must be provided to a qualified church. This article 
contributes to the field’s understanding of the interplay of law and administration by examining the constitutional 
issues in the case and their implications for public administration. By considering how this dispute was framed and 
the ways in which the court approached its resolution, public officials can better understand the issues in similar cases; 
anticipate potential disputes; and (re)design policies that will serve their communities, remain within constitutional 
limits, and reduce the likelihood of litigation . 
 Evidence for Practice 
•  Public administration is based in management, political science, and the law, so effective public 
administrators need to stay abreast of developments in the law when designing policies and programs. 
•  A given set of facts can be interpreted through different legal lenses, each with unique implications for public 
administration. 
•  While direct service areas of government such as education, housing, and human resources have become 
sensitive to constitutional considerations, other areas of public service are becoming increasingly affected. 
•  The contours of the constitutional requirement of government neutrality toward religion continue to be 
tested and evolve. 
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 Rosenbloom, O’Leary, and Chanin ( 2010a ) remind us that legal developments have    significant implications for public 
administration. “Government can no longer distribute 
benefits with little or no regard for equal protection. 
It cannot attach whatever conditions it desires to the 
receipt of public benefits” (2010b, 144). Rosenbloom 
and Naff, commenting on public administration 
education, emphasize that “[t]here is no doubt that 
law is relevant to public administrative practice. Law 
establishes, empowers, structures, and constrains agencies 
and programs” (2010, 217). And Wright suggests 
that public administration practitioners look to U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions to guide behavior, and he notes 
the need for scholars to “identify and interpret important 
cases for public administration practitioners and scholars 
who have limited formal legal training” (2011, 99). 
He suggests that law journals fill that need, but public 
administrators are less likely to read law journals than 
 PAR . This article is one step in that direction. 
 In June 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its 
decision in the case of  Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer (137 S. Ct. 2012), a dispute 
over whether a state grant, generally available to the 
public, must be provided to a church that meets 
the program’s secular eligibility criteria. It had been 
15 years since the Supreme Court dealt with a case 
involving public monies going to a church. The issues 
in this case were significant enough that 19 states filed 
amici curiae briefs with the court. 1 
 This article begins with a short recitation of the facts 
of the case and then explains the legal landscape in 
which the case sat. The arguments of the two parties 
are described, followed by a discussion of the several 
opinions delivered by the justices of the Supreme 
Court. The goal of providing this background, and 
not simply explaining the outcome, is to provide 
public administration scholars and practitioners some 
insight into how such controversies arise and are 
resolved. The article concludes with implications for 
public administration. 
 The Missouri Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR) runs a waste management program that 
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recycles vehicle tires and converts them into a cushiony material for 
playground surfaces. The DNR offers grants that provide funds to 
reimburse nonprofit playground operators that install this material. 
The funds are sourced from fees paid by buyers of new tires. The 
goal of the program is to reduce solid waste in landfills; it has the 
secondary aim of protecting playground children by assisting the 
owner nonprofit organizations. In 2012, Trinity Lutheran Church 
of Columbia, Missouri, applied for a grant. The church maintains a 
playground in support of its preschool and child care center. Trinity 
considers the preschool part of its ministry, and it features religious 
programming. The playground is also open to the public in the 
evenings and weekends when the center is not operating. Forty-four 
grant applications were submitted; Trinity’s ranked fifth against the 
DNR’s criteria, and the top 14 were funded. 
 However, the DNR noticed that Trinity is a church. Article I, 
section 7 of the Missouri Constitution says, “No money shall ever 
be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any 
church.” It was undisputed in the case that the sole reason the DNR 
refused to fund Trinity’s playground grant was that the playground 
is owned by a church, and such a grant would violate the “no aid” 
provisions in the state constitution. Trinity sued in federal district 
court with a First and Fourteenth Amendment claim. The district 
court dismissed the suit, Trinity appealed, and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed (sub nom.  Trinity Lutheran 
v. Pauley 2015). The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in 
January 2016, less than a month before Justice Antonin Scalia died. 
Perhaps fearing a 4–4 tie, the court deferred oral arguments until 
April 2017, after the investiture of Justice Neil Gorsuch. 
 The Legal Landscape 
 Before looking at the dispute between Trinity and the DNR, it 
is important to consider the legal landscape in which this case 
rested with respect to the relationship between church and state. 
Because that relationship is extremely complex, the reader must be 
mindful that the landscape being painted here is limited to only 
what is necessary to comprehend the principal issues in this case. 
Those who wish to dive more deeply into this area are referred 
to Hamburger ( 2002 ) and Ledewitz ( 2011 ). Of greatest concern 
here are cases involving the use of public funds for purposes that 
intersect with religion and cases involving government actions that 
specifically target religion. 
 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution restricts Congress 
from “respecting an establishment of religion” and from “prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof.” These are referred to as the establishment 
and free exercise clauses, respectively, or the religion clauses, 
collectively. These restrictions are incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the due process clause and therefore apply to state 
and local government actions. Of course, the devil in the details 
is what constitutes respecting an establishment or prohibiting free 
exercise. This case rests on a few key precedents. 
 The appellate court held that  Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann (364 
F. Supp. 376 [W.D. Mo. 1973]) was the controlling precedent 
over  Trinity . The Luetkemeyers had enrolled their elementary-
school-age children in a Catholic school in Missouri. The state of 
Missouri at the time bused only public school children to school 
but not children attending parochial or secular private schools. 
Relying on  Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing 
(67 S. Ct. 504 [1947]), a case in which a community’s choice to 
bus children to parochial schools was upheld, the Luetkemeyers 
sued under the theory that busing is a public service to students, 
not churches, and that denying them a bus ride was a violation 
of the free exercise clause. The  Luetkemeyer court ruled in favor 
of the school district, holding that although the state may choose 
to bus privately schooled children, including parochial school 
children, it was not compelled to do so. Given that “Missouri has 
a long history of maintaining a very high wall between church and 
state” ( Luetkemeyer, 364 F. Supp. at 383), the decision to limit its 
resources to busing only public school students was rational and not 
discriminatory against religion. 
 In  Locke v. Davey (124 S. Ct. 1307 [2004]), the State of Washington 
established a scholarship program for gifted students. Students 
could receive these scholarships if they met both academic and 
needs-based merit requirements and attended any accredited 
Washington school (including religiously affiliated schools), 
provided they did not major in devotional theology. The concern 
was that devotional theology prepared clergy for religious duties 
and would violate the establishment clause. Other academic majors, 
including subjects such as comparative religion, were permissible as 
being primarily academic and not professional. Davey, who majored 
in devotional theology, sued and lost in a 7–2 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision. The court held that “there are some state actions permitted 
by the establishment Clause but not required by the free exercise 
Clause” and that this case sat in that “play in the joints” ( Locke, 124 
S. Ct. at 719). 
 In another funding case, the University of Wisconsin–Madison 
collected activity fees from students and distributed them to 
organized student groups, a program that it explained created “a 
public forum that advances its academic mission using viewpoint-
neutral criteria” for allocating the funds ( Badger Catholic, Inc. v. 
Walsh, 620 F. 3d 775 [7th Cir. 2010]). Student groups submitted 
budgets to the university to have their expenses funded. One 
religiously affiliated group, Badger Catholic, was not reimbursed for 
expenses the university deemed worship, proselytizing, or religious 
instruction out of establishment clause concerns. Because the 
university claimed it was creating a public forum for student speech, 
the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional to refuse to fund a 
particular form of speech. Funding all of Badger Catholic’s expenses 
would not offend the establishment clause, but refusing to fund the 
group did offend the free exercise clause. 
 Locke and  Badger Catholic might appear to come to opposite 
conclusions: in one case, a state university was permitted to 
not fund something devotional, but the second university was 
compelled to fund a similar activity. The distinction drawn by 
the court was that the State of Washington was exercising plenary 
control over what it was funding and, to the extent that funding 
something is viewed as speech, the state may choose the message it 
wishes to convey (see, e.g.,  Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 [1976]; 
 Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2239 [2015]). Conversely, the University of Wisconsin funded 
free speech—speech chosen by the students, not the university—
but then denied a specific group of students a particular form of 
protected speech ( Badger Catholic, 620 F. 3d at 780). 
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 But  Locke has not been consistently interpreted, which is what made 
 Trinity especially ripe for the Supreme Court. The First and Eighth 
Circuit courts have interpreted  Locke to permit states to exclude 
religious groups from secular benefits. Meanwhile, the Seventh 
and Tenth Circuits have held that states must cite historical and 
substantial interests to constitutionally exclude religious groups 
from otherwise neutral benefits. As described here, the Supreme 
Court’s opinions in  Trinity do not provide the degree of clarity 
hoped for. 
 It  Mitchell v. Helms (120 S. Ct. 2530 [2000]), a federal program 
distributed funds to state and local government agencies, which, 
in turn, lent educational materials to public and private schools. 
By statute, the things acquired were secular—library services 
and computers, for example—but 30 percent of the schools that 
received this benefit were private, most of which were religiously 
affiliated. The program was challenged on establishment clause 
grounds. By a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the 
program was constitutionally permissible after applying the Lemon 
test, derived from case precedent. The test asks whether the statute 
(a) has a secular purpose, (b) has a primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion, and (c) creates an excessive entanglement 
between government and religion. The computers and other items 
were deemed secular, they did not advance or inhibit religion (even 
though the possibility existed to divert some of those materials to 
religious use, such diversion would not be caused by government 
action), and there was no continuing monitoring or oversight by 
government. The cases concerning public monies and religion are 
summarized in table 1. 
 Moving from funding cases to cases targeting religion, in  McDaniel 
v. Paty (98 S. Ct. 1322 [1978]), Paul McDaniel, a Baptist 
minister, filed as a candidate for the Tennessee state constitutional 
convention. Selma Paty sought an injunction declaring McDaniel 
ineligible because a state statute prohibited ministers from serving 
as legislators. The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held for 
McDaniel because the statute made the ability to exercise civil rights 
conditional on surrendering religious rights and therefore violated 
the free exercise clause. “As construed, the exclusion manifests 
patent hostility toward, not neutrality respecting, religion; forces or 
influences a minister or priest to abandon his ministry as the price 
of public office; and, in sum, has a primary effect which inhibits 
religion. . . . Government generally may not use religion as a basis 
of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges, or 
benefits” ( McDaniel, 98 S. Ct. at 636–38). 
 Finally, a pair of cases establish an important principle regarding 
the justification necessary by the state for laws that impact religious 
acts:  Employment Div. v. Smith (110 S. Ct. 1595 [1990]) and 
 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (113 S. 
Ct. 2217 [1993]). In the first case, a public employee was fired 
for ingesting peyote (an illegal hallucinogenic drug) as part of 
a Native American religious ceremony. In the second, the city 
adopted ordinances banning ritualistic animal sacrifice after it was 
announced that a Santeria church was to be established in the town. 
In the Supreme Court’s opinion on the  Smith case, it provided that 
“the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general 
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a 
 Table 1  Summary of Cases Concerning the Use of Public Funds and Religion 
 Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann  Locke v. Davey  Badger Catholic v. Walsh  Mitchell v. Helms 
 What did government provide? Busing for public school 
children
College scholarships A public forum for speech, 
through student fees
Federal funds to state and local 
governments that provided 
secular educational materials 
and services 
 Did a government retain plenary 
control over the allocation of 
funds, goods or services? 
Yes No–the student could decide 
what to study
Yes—the university reimbursed 
student groups after they 
submitted budgets
Yes—state and local 
governments chose what 
to buy 
 Was the benefi t generally 
available or restricted in its 
availability? 
Restricted to children attending 
public schools
Available to any student who 
met academic and needs 
criteria and attended any 
accredited school, except 
students who studied 
devotional theology
None of the funding could be 
used for religious worship 
or proselytizing or religious 
instruction
Generally available to all public 
and private schools, including 
religious schools 
 Question before the court Does the denial of 
transportation for private 
school children when 
the state provides public 
transportation for public 
school children violate the 
equal protection or free 
exercise clauses?
Does the First Amendment’s 
free exercise clause require 
a state to fund religious 
instruction if the state 
provides college scholarships 
for secular instruction?
Does the refusal to fund a 
student organization’s 
activities that are regarded 
as religious worship or 
proselytizing from an 
account created to be a 
limited public forum violate 
the free exercise clause?
Does chapter 2 of the 
Education Consolidation 
and Improvement Act of 
1981 (program authorizing 
legislation) violate the 
establishment clause? 
 Court decision No (2–1) No (7–2) Yes (unanimous) No (6–3 plurality) 
 Brief rationale for the decision The state is free to decide 
how to allocate its 
resources so long as it 
does not discriminate 
unconstitutionally. Choosing 
to bus only public school 
students was a rational 
limitation of public services 
that was not offensive to the 
constitution.
The state drew a line to avoid 
paying for the devotional 
preparation of clergy but 
still permitted the academic 
study of religion. The court 
held that was a reasonable 
balance between the 
establishment and free 
exercise clauses.
By establishing a forum for 
free speech, the public 
university could not then 
restrict the type of speech 
funded from the account. 
This was deemed viewpoint 
discrimination and a 
violation of the free exercise 
clause.
Applied the Lemon test to 
determine whether there 
is an establishment clause 
violation: whether the statute 
(a) has a secular purpose, 
(b) has a primary effect 
of advancing or inhibiting 
religion, and (c) creates an 
excessive entanglement 
between government and 
religion.
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particular religious practice. . . . Neutrality and general applicability 
are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one requirement is a 
likely indication that the other has not been satisfied. A law failing 
to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance 
that interest” ( Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 531). Because ingesting peyote 
is banned under a religiously neutral law regulating drug use, 
the employee’s free exercise of religion was not unduly burdened. 
But the laws that banned a specific ritual in response to the 
establishment of a particular church were deemed not neutral and 
thus hostile to the free exercise of religion. These three cases are 
summarized in table 2. 
 To summarize, there are a few characteristics of these cases that 
the courts found to be important in reaching a decision. These 
include what the government provided or proscribed, whether 
government retained plenary control over the allocation of what 
was provided, and any restrictions concerning who is considered 
an eligible beneficiary. From  Luetkemeyer, Badger Catholic, and 
 Mitchell, one can reach a general conclusion that when government 
retains plenary control of the allocation of secular goods or services, 
a distribution to a religious organization on terms equal to similar 
nonreligious organizations does not offend the establishment clause, 
and excluding religious organizations on terms equal to similar 
organizations does not necessarily offend the free exercise clause. 
From  McDaniel, Smith, and  Hialeah, a state action that specifically 
disadvantages the civic rights of an individual or organization 
based solely on religious status offends the constitution, but a 
generally applicable law that incidentally disadvantages religion is 
permissible. 
 The conclusions from  Locke are less clear. One could conclude that 
the state can limit beneficiaries when what is provided is money, 
rather than goods or services, and the money will be used for 
patently religious activity. Locke may also stand for the idea that a 
state may refuse to provide direct monetary aid to religious activities 
(or individuals pursuing religious devotion) without offending the 
constitution if properly justified. 
 The Controversy and Court Opinions 
 The Parties’ Arguments 
 In its petition, Trinity Church summarized the legal question as 
“[w]hether the exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and 
secular aid program violates the Free Exercise and Equal Protection 
clauses when the state has no valid Establishment clause concern.” 
Or, as the American Center for Law and Justice phrased it in an 
amicus brief, “In the distribution of entirely secular benefits (like 
playground safety resurfacing), may the government discriminate 
against otherwise eligible private entities solely on the basis they are 
owned by a church?” 
 Trinity argued that the DNR’s action in this case was not neutral but 
rather hostile to religion—and therefore violated the free exercise 
clause—because the church was denied a neutral benefit for no 
reason other than its status as a church. As in  McDaniel, the church 
was put in a disadvantaged position that required it to surrender its 
religion in order to access a civic program. The DNR’s program sent 
a message that the safety of all children, except the pious, are worthy 
of state assistance. Trinity clearly believed the interpretation of  Locke 
by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits was the correct one. 
 Trinity further argued that by adopting the interpretation 
of the lower court, this case presaged the denial of other 
routine government benefits to religious groups. If a church is 
constitutionally ineligible to participate in the scrap tire program, 
then nothing can stop the state from denying any other neutral 
government service, including police and fire protection, access 
to municipal water and sewage, the services of building code 
inspectors, or the use of high-occupancy vehicle lanes by church 
buses. If the state can require the religious to be equally burdened by 
laws that are generally applicable (such as the ban on using peyote), 
a neutral position demands that the state allow the religious to 
equally compete for generally applicable benefits. 
 Finally, Trinity argued that because the free exercise of religion is 
a fundamental right, the DNR’s decision based solely on Trinity’s 
religious status violated the equal protection clause, and the state’s 
 Table 2  Summary of Cases Concerning Government Actions Targeting Religion 
 McDaniel v. Paty  Employment Division v. Smith 
 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah 
 What did government do? State statute regarding eligibility to be a 
legislator excluded members of the clergy.
Smith was denied unemployment benefi ts 
because he was fi red for ingesting 
peyote; he had done so as part of his 
Native American religious practice.
City passed ordinances “forbidding 
the unnecessary killing of an animal 
in a ritual or ceremony not for the 
purpose of food consumption” in an 
emergency session shortly after being 
informed a Santeria church was being 
established in town. 
 Question before the court Does the statute barring “Minister[s] of the 
Gospel or priest[s] of any denomination 
whatever” from serving as legislators 
violate the free exercise clause?
Does the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment permit the State of Oregon 
to include religiously inspired peyote use 
within the reach of its general criminal 
prohibition on use of that drug?
Does an ordinance that appears neutral 
violate the free exercise clause if 
its legislative history shows it was 
motivated by religious animus and 
directly targets a religious practice? 
 Court decision Yes (unanimous) Yes (6–3) Yes (unanimous) 
 Brief rationale for the decision The statute made the ability to exercise 
civil rights conditional on surrendering 
religious rights and therefore violated the 
free exercise clause.
The free exercise clause permits the state 
to prohibit sacramental peyote use and 
thus to deny unemployment benefi ts to 
persons discharged for such use. Neutral 
laws of general applicability do not 
violate the free exercise clause of the First 
Amendment.
The local ordinances violate the free 
exercise clause because they were 
specifi cally designed to persecute or 
oppress a religion’s practices.
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actions needed to have passed strict scrutiny. That is, there needed 
to be a compelling government interest that was met using narrowly 
tailored means that were the least restrictive to constitutional 
liberties. Trinity asserted that a wholesale ban on religious applicants 
is not least restrictive and that the DNR had not advanced a 
compelling government interest. 
 On the other side of the dispute, in its reply briefs, the DNR cited 
the “no aid” clause of its constitution and reframed the legal issue 
as “whether states are required by the U.S. Constitution to violate 
their own constitutions and choose a church to receive a grant when 
that means turning down nonchurch applicants.” The DNR argued 
that it was not necessary to compel it to fund the church to avoid a 
free exercise clause violation. Its brief argued that there was no free 
exercise concern at all because the constitutional text bans actions 
that “prohibit” the free exercise of religion, and no action by the 
DNR interfered with the church’s ability to exercise its religion. It 
clearly agreed with the First Circuit’s interpretation of  Locke: “the 
Free Exercise Clause’s protection of religious beliefs and practices 
from direct government encroachment does not translate into an 
affirmative requirement that public entities fund religious activity 
simply because they choose to fund the secular equivalents of such 
activity” ( Eulitt v. Maine Department of Education, 386 F.3d 344 
[1st Cir. 2004], 354). 
 The DNR argued that by enshrining the “no aid” provision in its 
constitution, the state of Missouri had a long history of erecting a 
taller wall of separation between church and state than is required 
under the U.S. Constitution. A taller wall is not necessarily an 
unconstitutional wall ( Luetkemeyer, 364 F. Supp. at 383), and by 
funding no churches in any way, directly or indirectly, it is better 
positioned to uphold the establishment and equal protection 
clauses. The DNR argued, from the  Locke decision, that a choice 
not to subsidize has a minimal impact on religion, compared with 
state actions that actively impede religion (Hollman  2016 ). Refusing 
to fund the playground surface did not impede churchgoers’ ability 
to freely exercise their religion. 
 The DNR further argued that what a state chooses to fund is a form 
of government speech. Just as a contribution by an individual to a 
political candidate is a form of speech, government support for one 
entity over another is a form of speech. When government speaks, 
the First Amendment is not at issue, since the First Amendment 
only restricts what government can do to individuals. Consider 
the funding of arts, for example. Government administrators have 
discretion over what art is funded and what is not; no one can 
compel government to fund one person’s art over someone else’s. 
This is so because there is not an unlimited art budget, some 
discretion is necessary, and some art is acquired by the state to 
convey a particular message. Similarly, the tire scrap program is not 
unlimited; many secular playgrounds were denied funding. Here, 
the DNR is “saying” that it chose to fund only secular playgrounds, 
just as Missouri chose to bus only public school children in 
 Luetkemeyer . The DNR further distinguished the scrap tire program 
from the  Badger Catholic case because the DNR retained plenary 
control of the playground funds and was the speaker, whereas in 
Wisconsin, the funds went into a general fund (defined as a public 
forum) and the various student groups were the speakers and 
therefore had First Amendment protections. 
 The DNR furthered this line of reasoning by noting that the tire 
scrap program is not a generally available government benefit but 
rather a competitive grant. Grants are not available to everyone who 
applies. The award of a grant requires a degree of discretion by the 
DNR administrators, and banning churches removes the risk that a 
grant could be perceived as favoring certain sects over others. 
 Because the DNR’s position was that there is neither a First nor a 
Fourteenth Amendment concern, its policies did not need to meet 
the standard of strict scrutiny, and it merely needed a rational basis 
for its actions (Howe  2017 ). It noted that the  Locke court found no 
violation of the free exercise clause and, as such, applied a rational 
basis to Washington’s actions. The DNR stated that establishment 
clause concerns, and upholding the state constitution, were 
sufficient rational reasons to exclude the church from the tire scrap 
program. 
 The Interests of Other States 
 Nineteen state attorneys general filed amici curiae briefs with the 
court. Nevada and 17 others filed together; Colorado filed alone 
because it had a related case pending in the courts that would be 
impacted by the  Trinity decision. All 19 states urged the court to 
find for the church. Their legal arguments were similar to Trinity’s 
and have already been addressed, so the focus here is on the impact 
on the states. The states asserted that the unequal treatment of 
the  Locke decision by state and federal courts meant that state and 
municipal governments found themselves as legal parties on both 
sides of the issue. The Nevada brief asked the Supreme Court to 
rule that a state’s “anti-establishment interests must be justified by 
some reasoning that connects the unequal treatment of the religious 
to the purpose of the program.” Here, it claimed, the program 
was motivated by environmental and public safety concerns and 
had no relationship to religion. The states were concerned that if 
 Locke stood for the permission to exclude the religious without 
justification, states seeking to apply a “no aid” amendment would 
be sued for differentiating, but if they chose to include the religious, 
they would be “sued for  failing to differentiate.” 
 This concern became evident in an unusual twist to this case. Only 
six days before oral arguments before the Supreme Court, newly 
elected Missouri governor Eric Greitens announced that the DNR 
would no longer exclude religious entities from participation in 
the scrap tire program. The court asked both sides to provide their 
views regarding whether the case was moot. Both sides urged the 
court to hear the case, citing arguments that echoed the amici states’ 
concerns: Missouri would be vulnerable to lawsuit enjoining it 
from enacting the new policy (the Missouri attorney general even 
recused himself because of this conflict), and the state could always 
change its mind, reigniting a challenge like the present one. Both 
sides urged the court to hear the case and render a ruling to provide 
certainty to these disputes (Keller  2017 ). 
 The Court’s Opinions 
 In any case before the Supreme Court, to reach a decision, each 
justice will independently interpret the facts in light of the law 
and relevant case precedent. Which facts are germane and which 
precedents should control are debatable. Were the court entirely 
rational, the ultimate outcome would be a product of each justice 
applying his or her individual judicial philosophy to how the facts 
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should be interpreted through the lens of the law, followed by the 
ability to persuade his or her colleagues. But we know the justices 
approach the law with ideological biases (Martin and Quinn 
 2007 ; Martin, Quinn, and Epstein  2005 ). The conservatives on 
the court tend to take an accommodationist approach to religious 
cases, treating the establishment clause permissively and the free 
exercise clause restrictively. One would expect them to find Trinity’s 
arguments compelling. The liberals on the court usually take a more 
separationist approach, preferring to keep government further away 
from church affairs, and one would expect them to favor the DNR’s 
arguments (Tagliarina  2017 ). 
 Ultimately, the court ruled 7–2 in favor of Trinity. Fears of a 
potential split were evidently unfounded, but the seven justices in 
the majority were not unified. In fact, the opinion of the court was 
delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts, joined only by Anthony 
Kennedy, Samuel Alito, and Elena Kagan. Clarence Thomas filed a 
concurring opinion joined by Gorsuch, and Gorsuch filed a separate 
concurrence joined by Thomas. Stephen Breyer filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment only. Only Sonia Sotomayor dissented, 
joined by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Since only four justices joined the 
court’s opinion, which is less than a majority, the court rendered 
what is called a plurality decision. “When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys 
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed 
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds’” ( Marks v. United States, 
97 S. Ct. 990 [1977], 995). The various opinions are summarized 
in turn, and the narrowest grounds are discussed. 
 The plurality decision held that this case was in the tradition of 
 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah in noting that religious 
observers are protected against unequal treatment, and of  McDaniel 
v. Paty in that a generally available benefit denied solely on account 
of religious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of 
religion. It further noted that such a penalty must withstand strict 
scrutiny. The court was careful to note that the discrimination 
against Trinity was not the denial of a grant but the denial to 
compete for a grant on equal footing with secular organizations. 
The opinion emphasized that the case was not controlled by  Locke 
v. Davey, observing that “Davey was not denied a scholarship 
because of who he  was; he was denied a scholarship because of 
what he proposed  to do ” ( Trinity, 137 S. Ct. at 2016). Davey had 
sought funding to become a minister; Trinity sought funding to 
resurface a playground. The entire opinion was grounded in First 
Amendment (free exercise) concerns, and a footnote expressly 
stated that the court did not need to consider the church’s equal 
protection argument. (Typically, cases involving religion are decided 
through the application of the religion clauses rather than through 
other fundamental rights such as equal protection or free speech.) 
Footnote 3 of the opinion, which was a concern for others on the 
bench, stated that the court’s holding was limited to discrimination 
based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing 
and did not address other forms of discrimination. 
 In a concurring opinion, Thomas (joined by Gorsuch) took the 
opportunity to revisit his dissent in the  Locke case, emphasizing 
that discrimination based on religious grounds must be subject to 
heightened scrutiny, not just a rational basis test. 
 In another concurring opinion, Gorsuch (joined by Thomas) 
expressed concern with the stability of the court’s distinction 
between discrimination on the basis of religious status and religious 
use, analogizing whether there is a legal distinction between a 
religious man who says grace before dinner and a man who begins 
dinner in religious manner. He would limit  Locke to mean that the 
state cannot fund the training of the clergy, making it irrelevant to 
the facts in  Trinity . His concurrence also said that he was unable to 
join in footnote 3 for fear that some might read the case to apply 
only to future cases related to playgrounds or children’s safety 
programs rather than standing for a general principle. 
 Breyer concurred in the judgment but not all of the court’s 
reasoning. He appeared to support footnote 3—although he 
conspicuously did not mention it—by emphasizing the nature of 
the public benefit at issue and noted that “public benefits come in 
many shapes and sizes [and he] would leave the application of the 
Free Exercise Clause to other kinds of public benefits for another 
day” ( Trinity, 137 S. Ct. at 2027). 
 The court’s opinion and three concurrences were a brief 22 pages 
long. The lone dissent was 27 pages long. Writing passionately, 
Sotomayor recounted the history of religious clause jurisprudence 
and made the case that churches must be treated differently by 
virtue of the competing religion clauses. She charged the court with 
ignoring precedent, critical facts, and not allowing for establishment 
clause considerations, stating that antiestablishment concerns are at 
their peak when public monies are distributed to religious entities. 
Citing  Locke and other cases, she noted that when a religious entity 
is singled out, the reasons are critical. Because Trinity Church used 
the playground as an instrument of its children’s ministry, she 
argued that the grant would essentially provide public funds to 
improve church facilities in support of religious exercise, something 
courts have prohibited since  Everson (1947). She further argued that 
since there are two constitutional clauses bounding government’s 
relationship with religion, balancing those concerns is more 
appropriate than applying a strict scrutiny standard. 
 In short, the court’s majority clearly saw Missouri funding a 
playground; the dissent saw the state funding a church. 
 At its narrowest, six of the justices agreed that when a generally 
available public benefit, awarded on secular criteria, is denied to 
an otherwise eligible group solely because of its religious identity, 
that violates the free exercise clause, unless the reason for such a 
denial meets a strict level of scrutiny. The footnote limiting the 
applicability of the decision was only explicitly supported by four 
justices, but a future court may be tempted to interpret Breyer’s 
opinion as offering sufficient support to reach five. 
 What is new here? If one believes that  Luetkemeyer, Badger 
Catholic, and  Mitchell are controlling precedent, some claim that 
the court has suddenly moved from a separationist position to an 
accommodationist one (Lupu and Tuttle,  forthcoming ). That may 
read too much into the decision, though. The general rule laid 
out earlier from that line of cases said there is not a free exercise 
concern if religious entities are excluded on terms equal to similar 
organizations. In  Trinity, the terms were not equal; only churches 
were excluded, simply because they were churches. On the other 
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hand, those who believe that  McDaniel and  Hialeah control see the 
court’s ruling as consistent with precedent, requiring the state to 
maintain a neutral stance with respect to its dealings with religious 
entities’ participation in secular programs (Hawley  2017 ; Yarger 
 2017 ). The decision did not strike Missouri’s “no aid” constitutional 
amendment; that was never a question before the court. In respect 
for Missouri’s constitution, the decision should be interpreted to 
mean that Missouri would not be aiding a church; rather, the state 
would be aiding children’s safety and the environment. 
 Discussion 
 This case presented an issue that appears to be unique in the public 
administration literature on state-church relations. The extant 
literature has most often dealt with partnerships with faith-based 
organizations to implement policy and deliver services, a topic 
that was at the forefront with the charitable choice feature of the 
Clinton-era welfare reform and the Bush (43) faith-based initiatives 
(e.g., Bielefeld and Cleveland  2013 ; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 
 2011 ; Gibelman  2007 ; Kennedy and Bielefeld  2002 ; Smith and 
Sosin  2001 ; Twombly  2002 ). Bielefeld and Cleveland ( 2013 ) 
provide a particularly good summary of church-state concerns 
with respect to partnerships with faith-based organizations. 
 The literature has also examined the voice of churches and 
religious groups in setting policy (e.g., Amsler  2016 ; Carter 
 2000 ; Koliba, Meek and Zia  2010 ; White and Jeter  2002 ). This 
literature tends to look at the issue from a political science or 
public service ethos perspective, but there is comparatively little 
attention placed on the legal parameters that affect administrators. 
Amsler ( 2016 ) is a noteworthy exception. There is also a body 
of literature on spirituality in the workplace and employee 
performance (e.g., Bruce  2000 ; Garcia-Zamor  2003 ; King 
 2007 ), but that literature focuses on the religiosity or spirituality 
of government employees rather than government support of 
religious organizations. Where that literature covers legal issues, 
it is typically in the domain of balancing individual rights against 
the state’s need for an efficient and orderly workplace (Richards 
 1998 ; White and Jeter  2002 ). 
 Thus, there is little in the literature regarding a church as the direct 
beneficiary of government services or grants. In their text  Public 
Administration and Law, Rosenbloom, O’Leary, and Chanin’s 
chapter on clients and customers of public agencies discusses equal 
protection in the areas of race, ethnicity, gender, and nonsuspect 
classifications, but they are nearly silent on the topic of religion 
(2010b, 128–33).  Trinity presents an opportunity to examine this 
area of the law and its implications for public administration. 
 What does the  Trinity decision mean for public administration? 2 
First, let us review the parameters of the court’s holding: when a 
generally available public benefit, awarded on secular criteria, is 
denied to an otherwise eligible group solely because of its religious 
identity, that violates the free exercise clause, unless the reason for 
such a denial meets a strict level of scrutiny. The decision means 
that religious status cannot normally be the only reason to deny a 
generally available benefit, but it can be if the government has a 
compelling reason and designs the religious exemption narrowly. 
Simply having a “no aid” provision in the state’s constitution does 
not suffice. 
 Thus, the decision should be of comfort to those governments 
that use public monies to pursue secular goals through, or with, 
religiously affiliated entities. Examples include the use of faith-
based hospitals to treat the underinsured, the use of faith-based 
organizations to provide social services (e.g., marriage and drug 
counseling), the Department of Homeland Security’s security grant 
program that has been used to protect synagogues and mosques 
from terrorist threats, federal grants for asbestos removal in schools, 
and the Interior Department’s “Save our Treasures” program 
that funded restoration work at Boston’s Old North Church and 
Newport’s Touro Synagogue. 
 Next, there are 37 states in addition to Missouri that have “no aid” 
provisions in their constitution. There is a good deal of variation 
in the scope of them (DeForrest  2003 ). For those that are most 
restrictive, such as Missouri’s, this case is most applicable. Other 
states may already have constitutional or statutory language that 
address programmatic limits on state aid to religious entities. 
Going forward, when designing or modifying grant programs, 
states with such laws may need to be more inclusive regarding 
who is eligible for programs that have secular purposes. Overly 
broad interpretations of what it means to provide “aid to a church” 
will likely be challenged. A wholesale exclusion like Missouri’s 
now needs to be justified on grounds firmer than simply avoiding 
an establishment clause concern. The court outlined a specific 
circumstance in which a strict scrutiny standard should apply, 
but most religious clause cases are not so clear and will require a 
balancing approach of the type advocated by the dissent and used 
in  Locke and  Mitchell . 
 Practitioners should review programs that have secular competitive 
criteria because the discrimination noted in  Trinity was the church’s 
inability to compete on equal footing. As Nevada suggested in its 
amicus brief, disparate treatment of religious entities should be 
related to the purpose of the government program. The scrap tire 
program has a secular purpose—an environmental program with the 
incidental benefit of child safety. The program’s primary effect does 
not advance nor inhibit religion, so religion should not have been a 
disqualifying criterion. 
 It was widely reported in the media after the decision was handed 
down that  Trinity might open the door for more government 
support of religious schools. Public school advocates’ concern 
regarding vouchers is that since  Trinity permits the state to write a 
check directly to a church for a general public benefit, a state might 
write a check directly to a parochial school under the guise that 
education is also a general public benefit. That is unlikely, however, 
because under current constitutional law ( Zellman v. Simmons-
Harris, et al., 122 S. Ct. 2460 [2002]), such an action would be 
considered unconstitutional, and  Trinity does not change that. 
 Unfortunately, this case did not provide clarity regarding the 
interpretation of  Locke and the conflicting interpretations of the 
lower courts. The court’s opinion expressly states that  Locke did 
not control the outcome, and the distinction between religious 
status and religious use was held by only a minority of the justices. 
Clarifying the boundaries of  Locke nationwide will need to wait for 
another case. Locally, practitioners should continue to follow the 
precedent of rulings in their jurisdiction. 
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 Finally, might states still see themselves on both sides of church-
state disputes? Of course they will. As with any policy area, there 
are multiple valid perspectives and strongly held preferences. There 
will always be accommodationists and separationists. Because 
church-state relations is an area of constitutional law that requires 
interpreting competing language, those multiple perspectives will 
clash. Did Missouri fund a playground or a church? Seven-ninths 
of the court said a playground. At other times in history, the 
proportion might have been different. 
 Conclusion 
 The facts of  Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer were quite simple. 
The questions it raised were not. When the DNR crafted the 
rules for the tire scrap program, it most likely thought it was 
providing an innovative and worthwhile public benefit while 
honoring a historic Missouri constitutional principle of refusing 
to provide aid to churches. It probably did not expect to be 
before the Supreme Court arguing one position while the 
governor attempted to shift policy in the opposite direction. 
Society looks to constitutions to provide stability, but a change 
in administration, a change in the membership of a court, or the 
evolution of societal norms can lead to differing interpretations 
with concomitant policy change. Government administrators 
need to adapt to these changes and gain the wisdom to foresee 
them. Courts, when faced with new facts, need to consistently 
interpret constitutions in a manner that promotes stability and 
predictability for both citizen and state. But citizen and state must 
also submit to the reality that a given set of facts can be validly 
interpreted in multiple ways. 
 “[T]here is no doubt the courts have added considerable complexity 
to public administration. Today the field must go well beyond its 
traditional managerial base. It must incorporate constitutional law 
and values into its decision making and operations“ (Rosenbloom, 
O’Leary, and Chanin  2010b , 146). Policy areas such as public 
education, public housing, and human resources learned this lesson 
over the past few decades; now that requirement is extending to 
departments of natural resources and other areas in which there has 
not been as much direct client service. 
 By showing various ways a dispute is framed and the ways in which 
a court approaches resolution of the dispute, public administrators 
can better understand the issues in similar cases and hopefully craft 
policies that are less prone to litigation. Practitioners designing 
programs that have the potential of aiding religious groups, or 
discriminating against them, face a set of considerations. The field 
of public administration should stay abreast of cases such as  Trinity, 
anticipate potential disputes, and (re)design policies that will serve 
their communities, remain within constitutional limits, and reduce 
the likelihood of litigation. 
 Notes 
 1.  Amicus curiae (plural  amici ) is Latin for “friend of the court” and is someone 
who is not a party to the dispute but assists the court by providing relevant 
information or analysis. 
 2. Disclaimer: The information contained in this article is for informational and 
educational purposes only. Nothing in this article is intended, nor should it be 
construed, as legal advice. 
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